When you come at the king: Opposition coalitions and nearly stunning elections

The forthcoming article “When you come at the king: Opposition coalitions and nearly stunning elections” by Oren Samet is summarized by the author below.

For opposition parties competing in authoritarian elections, there can be significant benefits to working together and forming pre-election coalitions to challenge autocratic incumbents. Such coalitions have been widely understood as a boon not only to opposition prospects for victory, but also to the potential for democratization of authoritarian regimes.

But, as I show in my article, forming coalitions can also be risky. Coalitions have the potential to significantly improve opposition performance, boosting vote shares and helping parties overcome the difficulties of an unlevel playing field. Doing so, however, can also make oppositions more vulnerable to subsequent repression. In particular, where oppositions come very close to victory but fail to take power—an outcome I refer to as a nearly stunning election—regimes are left with both the incentive and capacity to crack down and bolster their autocratic control.

Using original cross-national data on opposition performance in authoritarian elections since the end of the Cold War, I show that opposition coalitions are associated with higher opposition vote shares. But I also demonstrate that the nearly stunning election scenario—which is, in many cases, facilitated by coalitions—is associated with greater democratic regression in elections’ aftermath, including increased repression and poorer electoral quality in future contests. These downsides persist into at least the medium term and become even more pronounced over time, undermining the potential for opposition parties to build on their gains and promote the kind of gradual moves toward democracy that other scholars have heralded.

Using the case of Cambodia, I show qualitatively how the very features that make opposition coalitions a useful tool in strengthening performance also invite new threats from regimes. Cambodia’s opposition united and came very close to a shocking upset victory in 2013 only to see their fortunes reverse by the next election, as the regime cracked down and ultimately banned the unified party outright. Other cases, from Venezuela to Zimbabwe, exhibit similar patterns.

The findings do not mean that oppositions should forgo forming pre-election coalitions altogether. But they do implore us to take more seriously the risks that coalitions and strong challenges entail. The conclusions echo the classic line from the television drama, The Wire: when “you come at the king, you best not miss.”

About the Author: Oren Samet is a PhD candidate in the Political Science Department at the University of California, Berkeley. Their research “When you come at the king: Opposition coalitions and nearly stunning elections” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.