In Strongman We Trust: The Political Legacy of the New Village Movement in South Korea

The forthcoming article “In Strongman We Trust: The Political Legacy of the New Village Movement in South Koreaby Ji Yeon Hong, Sunkyoung Park, and Hyunjoo Yang is summarized by the authors below. 

A common perception of democratization is that it is a fresh start for a country’s politics. Nonetheless, an increasing volume of scholarly work has shown that democratization is not as fresh a start as is often assumed. Authoritarian legacies prevail and persist in many places, sometimes long after democratic consolidation. So, why do citizens support authoritarian successor parties or politicians with a direct connection to a country’s authoritarian past? In this paper, we show that large-scale distributive policies implemented under dictatorships may have persistent effects that linger long after democratization.  

We draw evidence from the New Village Movement (Saemaul Undong in Korean) that took place in South Korea in the 1970s. It was a nationwide rural development program that was initiated and implemented by then-dictator Park Chung-hee. We analyze government subsidies to villages under this program and regional voting patterns in recent elections, finding that the program has had a long-term effect on election outcomes. In a highly polarized election in 2012, Park Chung-hee’s daughter, Park Geun-hye, was democratically elected president. Villagers who benefitted from greater government subsidies in the 1970s were more likely to vote for Park Geun-hye in the election. 

Our further analysis of the mechanisms behind this effect reveal that the beneficiary voters did not support the dictator’s daughter because the program benefited them in the long run, either economically or non-economically. Using night-time satellite imagery as a proxy for economic activity, we find that villages that received greater subsidies actually have less economic activity today. In addition, the level of social capital in these villages does not differ from that of other rural villages. Instead, our analysis shows that the beneficiary villagers have a strong psychological affinity for the former dictator. Their support for him has not wavered despite several decades having passed since his regime. 

Our study sheds new light on the potential long-term effects of distributive policies under authoritarianism. Authoritarian leaders have considerable discretion in the distribution of economic resources. Often, their distributive programs target groups that are less privileged in terms of region, ethnicity, or class in the hopes of gaining their political support. Although democratization grants political rights to all citizens, these marginalized groups may experience economic and social disadvantages in a new democracy, and this has been the case for most rural residents of South Korea. These voters may thus show strong support for a former dictator who implemented a distributive policy that favored them, and in turn for a political party or politician that inherits the dictator’s legacy. 

About the Authors: Ji Yeon Hong is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan, Sunkyoung Park is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Incheon National University, and Hyunjoo Yang is an Associate Professor of Economics at Sogang University. Their research “In Strongman We Trust: The Political Legacy of the New Village Movement in South Korea” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

“A Sacred Effort”: Lincoln’s Second Inaugural and the Problem of Justice

The forthcoming article “‘A Sacred Effort’: Lincoln’s Second Inaugural and the Problem of Justice”  by Richard S. Ruderman is summarized by the author below. 

At a time when growing numbers of Americans are concerned that we are headed toward a new civil war, it is well worth re-examining Abraham Lincoln’s efforts to bring the original to a close in such a way as to avoid the recidivism so often associated with civil wars. Lincoln’s Second Inaugural has both impressed and perplexed audiences since its initial delivery. While most have been deeply moved by his call for “malice toward none” and “charity for all,” they have often been equally puzzled and even put off by the stern religiosity on display in the paragraph prior to his peroration. He was even accused, at the time, of “substituting religion for statesmanship.” In this article, I argue that it is his statesmanlike use of religion—indeed, of a new hybrid (still unnamed) religion, Judeo-Christianity—that provided the moral and psychological ground for overcoming the “malice” that so often attends the end of wars. Unlike the essentially post-religious (and uncharitable) statesmanship of the Allies in World War One that contributed in no small measure to the outbreak of World War Two, Lincoln’s statesmanship in the Second Inaugural provides a model for how to keep the “settling of scores”—the desire for punitive justice—from snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. Above all, we can learn from Lincoln that the punitive aspect of justice constitutes a moral and even philosophical “problem.” By this, I mean that Lincoln moved beyond our understanding of “the problem of justice”—namely that an action, law or policy may not live up to a (or “our”) standard of justice—to the deeper question of whether and how responsibility for an injustice can be assigned. Discerning Lincoln’s answer requires us to resolve the puzzle he inserts at the start of the speech, whereby he makes, in quick succession, the arguments that both sides are responsible for the war and that neither side is responsible. Finally, Lincoln offers the unusual argument that punishment must chiefly serve the purpose, not of punishing past injustice, but of laying the necessary ground for future “charity for all.”

About the Author: Richard S. Ruderman is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas. Their research “‘A Sacred Effort’: Lincoln’s Second Inaugural and the Problem of Justice” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

How Norms Shape the Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics

The forthcoming article “How Norms Shape the Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publicsby Eric GroenendykErik O. Kimbrough, and Mark Pickup is summarized by the authors below. 

Since the publication of Converse’s classic chapter on the nature of belief systems in mass publics, scholars have expressed concern about Americans’ apparent lack of ideological consistency. The concern is that, if voters’ belief systems are unconstrained by an ideology, they may be unable to develop coherent preferences over candidates and platforms and thus will struggle to ensure that democracy holds elites accountable.  We point out that the normative implications of the large literature confirming Converse’s findings depend crucially on how we think about the nature of ideology.  The validity of these concerns depends crucially on the extent to which ideological constraint arises from principled reasoning, as it is often assumed, or from pressure to conform to identity-based norms established by ideological elites, as we theorize.  

If ideological constraint is the product of norm conformity pressure, the normative implications of Americans’ famous lack of ideology are completely changed. Lack of constraint may not be the product of ignorance (or “innocence” as it is often termed in the literature). It may instead reflect pragmatism—knowingly preferring some policies despite their inconsistency with doctrine. Furthermore, to the extent norms are shaped by political elites, voters who show ideological constraint may actually be more susceptible to elite influence than pragmatists who are happy to “agree to disagree.” 

To test our norm conformity theory of ideology, we combine widely used survey questions measuring individuals’ own policy preferences with an incentivized coordination game that separately measures their knowledge of what other ideological group members expect them to believe.  This allows us to distinguish knowledge of ideological norms—what liberals and conservative believe ought to go with what–from adherence to those norms when expressing personal preferences.  We then assess whether conformity pressure causes ideological conformity using a question order experiment that varies whether ideological norms are primed prior to eliciting preferences.  

Our results confirm that a significant portion of what has been defined as ignorance (or “innocence”) can be attributed to pragmatism. And when ideological group norms are primed prior to measuring personal policy preferences, ideological conformity rises.  This suggests that ideological constraint is at least partially attributable to norm conformity pressure.  Together these findings raise doubts about whether ideology is actually desirable or if it instead allows elites to reverse the direction of democratic accountability by shaping the very norms that define what it means to be a “good liberal” or “good conservative”. 

About the Authors: Eric Groenendyk is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Memphis, Erik O. Kimbrough is a Professor of Economics at Chapman University, and Mark Pickup is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University. Their research “How Norms Shape the Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

How Threats of Exclusion Mobilize Palestinian Political Participation

The forthcoming article “How Threats of Exclusion Mobilize Palestinian Political Participation by Chagai M. Weiss, Alexandra Siegel, and David Romney is summarized by the authors below. 

Exclusionary policies target minority citizens around the world. Such policies range widely in severity, from assaults on religious freedom and targeted travel bans to direct threats to citizenship. Past research has explored how such policies affect minorities’ identities as well as their social and economic well-being. But how does the threat of these policies impact minorities’ political behavior and mobilization? In our research, we find that the threat of an exclusionary policy targeting Palestinian citizens of Israel, drove political mobilization on social media, turned out voters, and increased participation in civil society.  

Understanding how the threat of exclusionary policies impacts minorities’ political behavior is important because politicians often declare their policy intentions well before exclusionary policies become law. Minority mobilization might therefore prevent those policies from ever becoming reality. But studying the effect of exclusionary policies on minority mobilization is difficult. Governments might promote exclusionary policies for strategic reasons, responding to the increasing visibility or mobilization of a minority group. It is therefore challenging to determine whether minority political mobilization is the cause or an effect of government exclusionary policies. 

In our research, we develop a theory and design that help us answer this question. We argue that being targeted by an exclusionary policy can create or resurface political grievances that increase the propensity of minority communities to mobilize politically. To test our argument, we focus on Donald Trump’s 2020 announcement of a peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A portion of this peace plan proposed transfers of Palestinian residents in specific Israeli towns close to the West Bank (called the “Triangle”) to a future Palestinian state, posing a threat to the citizenship status of the Palestinian Citizens of Israel residing in those towns. We leverage two aspects Trump’s announcement—its timing and its differential potential impact on Palestinian citizens of Israel within and outside of the Triangle area—to identify the effect of this threat on political mobilization. Specifically, we adapt a “difference-in-difference” design, through which we trace patterns of political participation in Triangle and non-Triangle localities before and after Trump’s declaration. 

Analyzing over 170,000 Facebook posts, voting data from three parliamentary elections, and sign-up data from a social movement, we show that Palestinian citizens of Israel who were confronted with a threat to their citizenship status were more likely to discuss political issues on Facebook, vote in national elections, and join the listserv of a growing Jewish-Arab social movement. These results emphasize that government exclusion can increase minority mobilization. Our results also open a door for future research to examine the conditions under which minority mobilization may inhibit the implementation of exclusionary policies. 

About the Authors: Chagai M. Weiss is a Political Science PhD candidate at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and a Middle East Initiative predoctoral fellow at Harvard Kennedy School. Alexandra Siegel is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado at Boulder and David Romney is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young University. Their research “How Threats of Exclusion Mobilize Palestinian Political Participation” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability

The forthcoming article “How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability by Dana Foarta is summarized by the author below. 

Bureaucratic institutions are central to policy implementation. They formulate and execute plans for how government programs are put in practice. In many policy areas, several bureaucratic agencies have overlapping jurisdictions, meaning that any one of these agencies may be tasked with implementing a given government policy. Politicians have freedom to make this assignment choice. In this paper, I show how this allocation decision affects not only the bureaucracy itself, but also the formation of policy, the size and duration of government programs, and ultimately the voters’ ability to hold elected politicians accountable. 

The choice of which agency implements policy has tangible implications because of the significant differences between agencies. Some agencies have developed capacity to withstand political pressures, while others are still under close political control of the executive. Politicians may be tempted to assign policy implementation to agencies with less capacity, where they can exert control. Yet, this paper shows how doing so may be electorally dangerous. The political decision of which agency will implement policy feeds back through the political system. This political choice informs voters as to a politician’s true intent. The threat of electoral punishment in turn disciplines the politician’s behavior, reducing excessive reliance on low capacity agencies. 

Another consequence of the link between a politician’s electoral standing and her choice of bureaucratic implementation is that it enables agencies to develop ownership over government programs: the politician will relinquish control over policy implementation to higher capacity agencies to help her reelection chances. As a result, agencies keep control over their assigned government programs, and they keep them running long into the future. Therefore, multiple agencies with overlapping roles persist over time as a rational response to the problem of electoral accountability. Having multiple agencies of different capacity tasked with the same policy’s implementation might at first glance seem inefficient. Yet, this paper shows that such a bureaucratic structure may in fact serve the interests of voters, by facilitating better electoral accountability. 

 About the Author: Dana Foarta is an Assistant Professor of Political Economy at Stanford University. Their research “How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science. 

Antagonistic Cooperation: Factional Competition in the Shadow of Elections

The forthcoming article “Antagonistic Cooperation: Factional Competition in the Shadow of Elections” by Giovanna Invernizzi is summarized by the author below. 

Political parties are often internally divided into separate factions. When is factional competition good or bad for a party’s welfare? To tackle this question, I present a model of elections in which intra-party factions can devote resources to campaigning for the party or sabotage competing factions to obtain more power. 

The model shows that inter- and intra-party competition are substitutes: Internal competition increases when the electoral stakes are low – for example, in consensus democracies granting power to losing parties – because the incentives to focus on the fight for internal power increase. This result explains why reforms that changed the system towards a WTA (e.g., Italy and Japan) reduced intra-party fights.  

A similar logic applies to party polarization. As the ideological distance between parties increases, so do the stakes of (losing) the election, motivating factions to campaign for the party. Perhaps less intuitively, factions in the leading party campaign less than those in the trailing party, because platform asymmetry dampens the incentives for factions in the trailing party to campaign due to a lower winning probability. 

Parties develop internal rules to divide electoral spoils among factions. The paper studies how different incentive schemes motivate factions to campaign, and derive optimal rewards. Besides electoral spoils, the paper also shows how parties can encourage factions with policy concessions. 

About the Author: Giovanna Invernizzi is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Collegio Carlo Alberto and a Research Associate at Bocconi University. Their research “Antagonistic Cooperation: Factional Competition in the Shadow of Elections” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science. 

Sortition as Anti-Corruption: Popular Oversight against Elite Capture

The forthcoming article “Sortition as Anti-Corruption: Popular Oversight against Elite Capture” by Samuel Bagg is summarized by the author below.

Modern democracy depends on the idea that we can achieve self-government by electing our leaders. In an era of proliferating crises and skyrocketing inequality, however, many are beginning to suspect that this representative model is broken, and to wonder if the only way to wrest power away from wealthy donors is to give ordinary people more direct control of political decisions. 

Unfortunately, the track record of direct democracy is underwhelming. As it turns out, resisting elite capture isn’t as simple as ensuring that more people participate more directly in more decisions. In fact, many existing participatory institutions are quite vulnerable to manipulation themselves. Last year in California, for instance, tech companies spent hundreds of millions of dollars to pass an initiative denying benefits to millions of their workers. Meanwhile, procedures designed to boost public participation in regulatory rule-making have largely been co-opted by industry for decades. 
All of that said, we shouldn’t just give up hope. Real democratization is harder than it looks, but there are certain forms of direct participation that can help to protect the public interest. This paper outlines one such model—the citizen oversight jury—and argues that it can mitigate capture across a range of state institutions. 
At its core is the idea of random selection for political office, also known as “sortition.” Though it dates back to ancient Athens, sortition has attracted increasing attention in recent years as a way of disrupting certain forms of illicit influence. In short, any nonrandom method for choosing public officials—including election, appointment, and self-selection—will open up certain opportunities for elite manipulation. Only random selection eliminates such opportunities altogether. 
In light of this, many recent advocates of sortition have suggested that we replace many (if not all!) elected officials with randomly selected citizens. Yet sortition carries risks as well as rewards, and replacing elections with lotteries will not yield net improvements in all circumstances. Even if elites cannot influence who is selected to participate in a citizen legislature, for instance, they could still shape outcomes via the information and training participants receive after they are selected. 
When participants must perform complex, wide-ranging tasks that require lots of training, I argue, the risks of post-selection manipulation will outweigh the advantages of selecting them randomly. These dangers will be much less prominent, however, when participants are given simpler tasks that require less training. In such cases, the benefits of sortition are most likely to outweigh the costs. 
Drawing on this insight, I defend a model of citizen oversight juries that would empower randomly selected participants to make binary decisions on narrow questions whose terms are defined in advance—much like the verdicts juries must deliver in criminal trials. Instead of evaluating whether an individual is guilty of a crime, however, oversight jurors would evaluate whether a government decision is the result of capture. If so, that decision would be overturned or sent for further review. Even more importantly, the threat of citizen review would make capture much rarer to begin with. 
Many questions remain about exactly how citizen oversight juries should work, and exactly when they will be most effective. In the paper, however, I hope to have shown that citizen oversight has substantial promise as a tool of deeper democratization. 

About the Author: Samuel Bagg is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina. Their research “Sortition as Anti-Corruption: Popular Oversight against Elite Capture” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science. 

The Variable Persuasiveness of Political Rhetoric

The forthcoming article “The Variable Persuasiveness of Political Rhetoric” by Jack Blumenau and Benjamin E. Lauderdale is summarized by the authors below.

Which types of political rhetoric are most persuasive? Political arguments often feature common rhetorical elements, regardless of the specific policy at stake. Politicians can draw on endorsements from relevant authorities; take moral stances; articulate costs and benefits; impugn the motives of opposition actors; make comparisons with historical experiences; and so on. Learning whether some forms of rhetoric are generally more persuasive than others is important for speaking to contemporary normative theories of rhetoric, which suggest that some forms of political argument can threaten deliberative ideals. For instance, if voters consistently respond to arguments that are low in informational content but rich in bombast and élan, we might worry that the quality of deliberation has fallen.  

However, evaluating the relative persuasiveness of particular types of rhetoric is difficult because the arguments that politicians make are highly multidimensional. Arguments might deploy common elements, but they also vary in many other ways that make certain strategies effective in some instances but not in others.  

We propose a survey-experimental approach for measuring the relative persuasiveness of different rhetorical elements that addresses this challenge. In our experiment, we present pairs of arguments to survey respondents and ask them to assess which of the pair is most persuasive. We use 336 individual arguments, each of which uses one of 14 distinct rhetorical elements on each side of 12 policy issues in UK politics. By presenting many implementations of each element, we can draw inferences about the relative effectiveness of different rhetorical strategies averaged across different political issues, thereby minimizing the risk that our conclusions will be confounded by the idiosyncrasies of single implementations.  

This design also recognizes that researchers seldom want to test the effects of particular treatment texts. Rather, they typically want to make broader claims about a latent treatment, of which a treatment text is just one implementation. Because our focus is not on the effects of specific texts, but rather the distribution of such effects across implementations, we use a multilevel-modeling approach which allows us to estimate this distribution using several implementations, each of which would be statistically underpowered if analyzed alone. 

We find that there are modest average differences between different rhetorical element types. One of the strongest rhetorical elements is appeals to authority – arguments that seek support for an issue by reporting the view of an entity with relevant subject area expertise. By contrast, the weakest arguments are those that employ ad hominem attacks and those that rely on metaphor and imagery to win support for a policy stance. When compared to many other common forms of political rhetoric, arguments of these types are do have differentially persuasive effects in the eyes of the UK public, at least on average. 

However, we find that the heterogeneity in the persuasiveness of specific implementations of rhetorical elements is much larger than these average differences. Appeals to authority are more persuasive than other rhetorical styles on average, but some appeals of this sort are still among the weakest arguments we test. Similarly, comparisons to other countries feature in the lists of the most and least persuasive arguments, depending on the specific implementation. This represents an important lesson for the interpretation of existing studies in political communication, many of which are based on experiments relating to single policy issues.  

Ultimately, our goal is to understand which types of arguments induce voters to support or oppose policy proposals on different issues. However, persuasion is different from the self-reported judgements of argument persuasiveness that we elicit in our experiment. We therefore conduct a second, out-of-sample validation experiment and show that respondents’ evaluations of which arguments are more persuasive strongly predict the direction and magnitude of those arguments’ ability to persuade different respondents to change their stated attitudes. The validation demonstrates substantial persuasion effects on average, but we again observe large variation in these treatment effects across issues.  

This central substantive finding of argument persuasiveness heterogeneity suggests why scholarship on persuasion has not clearly decomposed the sources of persuasive appeal into distinct rhetorical elements: it is very difficult to identify rhetorical strategies that are consistently more persuasive than others when considered across multiple policy issues. Our findings imply that the persuasiveness of different argument types is likely to be highly context-dependent, and that analysing the rhetorical structure of arguments allows us to predict persuasiveness only to a limited extent. 

About the Authors: Jack Blumenau is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University College of London and Benjamin E. Lauderdale is a Professor of Political Science and Department Head at the University College of London. Their research “The Variable Persuasiveness of Political Rhetoric” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science. 

Parliamentary Constraints and Long-Term Development: Evidence from the Duchy of Württemberg

The forthcoming article “Parliamentary Constraints and Long-Term Development: Evidence from the Duchy of Württemberg” by Jonathan Doucette is summarized by the author below. 

It has long been argued that parliaments which could hold rulers accountable were an important driver of economic development in Europe. However, recent research has challenged this relationship by positing that favorable economic conditions caused parliaments and decided their institutional strength in the first place. Scholars trying to settle this ‘chicken and egg problem’ have focused on identifying the overall (lack of) effect of parliaments. This line of research faces the problem that European parliaments were often organized in very different ways, were not equally powerful, and had very different meeting frequencies. For instance, the differences between the French Estates-General, which never gained much power and stopped meeting early on, and the English/British parliament, which became a permanent political institution of constraint, are so stark that this approach sometimes becomes almost meaningless.  

Instead, we should carefully investigate whether specific parliaments seem to have had consequences for economic growth. I examine the parliament in the Duchy of Württemberg, which placed considerable checks on its dukes in the period from 1495 to 1796. I compare areas just inside of the Duchy with adjacent areas outside of it. Economically similar prior to 1495, areas within the Duchy exhibited additional economic activity following the advent of the strong Württemberg parliamentary. What explains this divergence? My results suggest that several mechanisms determine whether parliaments spur economic activity: First, areas that were directly represented in parliament were more likely to see growth. Second, areas that formed the basis of the local administration saw more growth. Third, parliamentary constraints may attract productive migrants from elsewhere.  

Based on my findings, there are thus several institutional configurations that can potentially limit the economy-enhancing properties of parliaments: Having few or geographically concentrated representatives in parliament may limit the likelihood of broad increases in economic activity; the delivery of public goods is likely to suffer if parliament cannot influence the allocation of new administrative seats; and finally, polities that remain closed off to outsiders cannot attract productive migrants. Future studies might therefore explore i) what kind of parliaments activate (or foreclose) these pathways to economic development, and ii) which of these pathways matter most for growth.

About the Author: Jonathan Doucette is an Assistant Professor at Aarhus University, Denmark. Their research “Parliamentary Constraints and Long-Term Development: Evidence from the Duchy of Württemberg” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science. 

Risk Aversion and the Gender Gap in the Vote for Populist Radical Right Parties

The forthcoming article “Risk Aversion and the Gender Gap in the Vote for Populist Radical Right Parties” by Odelia Oshri, Liran Harsgor, Reut Itzkovitch-Malka, and Or Tuttnauer is summarized by the authors below. 

Why do fewer women vote for populist radical right parties compared to men? 

With the growing power of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in Europe, a seminal question which is often discussed in both media and academia: Who votes for these parties? What characterizes their constituencies, and are they similar across countries? One statistical fact seems to be uniform: Women are significantly less likely to vote for PRRPs compared to men. What explains this gender gap in the support for PRRPs? 

In our recent paper we maintain that, for an individual, voting for a PRRP is fraught with a certain degree of risk. Not only are these parties comparatively unknown entities with limited parliamentary experience at best, but they also challenge the certainties of the existing political order. Consequently, we expect that risk-averse voters will shun them during elections. We establish that women are more risk-averse than men on two relevant dimensions. First, electorally, women tend more than men to avoid voting for parties that have no chance of winning seats in parliament, in case in point, many of the PRRPs; and second, in regard of socially acceptable behavior, women are less prone than men to translate their extreme ideological positions to vote choice.  

That said, we argue that the risk of voting for PRRPs varies depending on the electoral context. When PRRPs’ prospects to (re)enter parliament are high, the decision to vote for these parties is less risky, both electorally and socially: electorally, because in such circumstances, voting for these parties would not be tantamount to wasting one’s vote; socially, because when a PRRP has previously been supported by a large enough portion of the electorate, it can be perceived as a normative political player. 

Leveraging evidence from a large cross-national study as well as from a case study of Germany, we find that the gender gap in voting for PRRPs is higher in risky electoral contexts, i.e., when these parties are marginalized. As populist radical right parties garner sufficient electoral support, voting for them is considered less risky, therefore yielding less gender differences in the vote.  

The focal question of why women are more risk averse than men when it comes to political behavior fell beyond the scope of our study.  It might be, however, that women set great store by voting, perhaps more so than do men – after all, women’s suffrage is a relatively recent historical phenomenon. Our findings open the gate for further exciting theoretical and empirical research on this topic.  

About the Authors: Odelia Oshri is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Liran Harsgor is an Assistant Professor at the Division of Government and Political Theory, School of Political Science, University of Haifa. Reut Itzkovitch-Malka is an Assistant Professor of Political Science, in the Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication, at the Open University of Israel, and Or Tuttnauer is an Alexander von Humboldt Postdoctoral Fellow at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. Their research “Risk Aversion and the Gender Gap in the Vote for Populist Radical Right Parties” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science. 


The American Journal of Political Science (AJPS) is the flagship journal of the Midwest Political Science Association and is published by Wiley.