A Public Ethics of Care for Policy Implementation

The forthcoming article “A Public Ethics of Care for Policy Implementation” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12487) by Daniel Engster is summarized by the author below.

A Public Ethics of Care for Policy Implementation

Dealing with government bureaucrats can be downright unpleasant at times. We may feel unheard, unseen, disrespected, and subject to seemingly arbitrary rules. How do these experiences mesh with the ideals of liberal-democratic government – particularly the notion that government should be attentive and responsive to the people and not govern in autocratic ways? 

In A Public Ethics of Care for Policy Implementation,” I suggest it is not. Liberal democracies have generally assumed that hierarchical, rule-bound, and impartial “Weberian” bureaucratic ethics is best suited for carrying out policies through the public bureaucracy. The idea is that bureaucrats will support liberal-democratic ideals by faithfully and mechanically enforcing the laws and policies enacted by the people’s democratically-elected representatives.  

The problem with this perspective is that bureaucrats invariably do have some discretion in applying laws and policies to individuals. This point, emphasized by Michael Lipsky in Street-Level Bureaucracy, has become a staple of research on policy implementation. Street-level bureaucrats, including social workers, child protection workers, police officers, municipal judges, and others all must decide which laws and policies apply to which particular individuals and cases, when, and how. Discretion is inherent in their jobs.  

Rule-bound and impartial bureaucratic ethics encourage administrators to disclaim this discretion for a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach to policy implementation. This is one of reasons dealing with government bureaucrats can be so frustrating. They claim they are “just following the rules” but we intuitively understand that they are actually following one interpretation of the rules and applying it without regard to our unique circumstances.  

If the discretion inherent in policy implementation is to be made consistent with liberal-democratic principles, I argue it must be subjected to democratic sanctioning. I propose in my article a public ethics of care as an alternative to the existing rule-bound, impartial bureaucratic ethics for achieving this democratic sanctioning and manifesting liberal principles of limited and responsive government in the public bureaucracy. A public ethics of care provides a model for the attentive and responsive use of discretion within the law by encouraging bureaucrats to relate to individuals as persons and work with them in appropriate ways to apply laws and policies to their circumstances. It can be achieved by emphasizing this approach within the administrative culture and changing promotion and review guidelines to reflect caring values. 

Integrating a public ethics of care into public administrations is important because, as Lipsky argued, individuals experience state power primarily through their encounters with street-level bureaucrats. If street-level bureaucrats exercise their powers in inattentive, unresponsive, and domineering ways, this is how many citizens will experience the liberal-democratic state.

About the Author: Daniel Engster is Professor, Hobby School of Public Affairs, The University of Houston. His research “A Public Ethics of Care for Policy Implementation” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12487) is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

The Policy Basis of Measured Partisan Animosity in the United States

The forthcoming article “The Policy Basis of Measured Partisan Animosity in the United States” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12498) by Lilla V. Orr and Gregory A. Huber is summarized by the authors below.

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Mass politics in the United States is increasingly characterized as being driven by overt hostility between Democrats and Republicans. So called partisan “teamism” is thought to extend beyond conflict over policies to include personal animosity toward members of the opposing party on the basis of their partisanship. Understanding and addressing the consequences of partisan animosity requires knowledge of its foundations. To what extent is animosity between partisan groups motivated by dislike for partisan out groups per se, other social group conflicts, or policy disagreement? In many circumstances, including most experimental research to date, these patterns are observationally equivalent.  

Scholars, journalists, and political leaders have argued that partisanship has become a kind of tribalism, in which members of each party blindly loath fellow citizens on the basis of their identity as members of the opposite party.1 In this view, Democrats and Republicans loath members of the other party precisely because of their membership in that out group. Others have argued, however, that this animosity does not arise solely on the basis of partisan identity, but is instead driven by hostility towards other social groups stereotypically associated with the parties. For example, Democrats may hold animus against Republicans because they assume Republicans to be evangelical Christians, while Republicans view Democrats as a group largely comprised of people of color.2  

However, these perspectives potentially ignore the fact that political parties in the United States are most fundamentally associated with policy platforms. Told nothing but a candidate for office’s partisanship, most people can readily guess that candidate’s likely positions on a host of contentious issues, from abortion policy to taxes. This fact suggests an alternative theoretical mechanism for why partisans sometimes express animosity toward members of their opposing party, one in which animosity is not about partisanship or group membership, but is instead driven by conflict about salient issues. To continue the example above, Democrats may express toward Republicans because they assume Republicans oppose abortion rights while Republicans object to Democrats as a group working to expand affirmative action. Such an account is particularly intriguing because despite clear elite polarization on key issues, the mass parties are much more heterogeneous, with substantial portions of Democrats holding moderate or conservative positions and Republicans having moderate or liberal positions. 

We designed a series of experiments that allow us to estimate the importance of policy views as a driver of partisan animosity. Using the same basic outcome measure as prior research, each survey respondent was asked to read a short vignette describing an individual. In line with prior research, we randomized the partisanship of that individual. Departing from prior work, however, we also randomized whether or not partisanship was presented alongside other information that respondents might assume on the basis of party. We estimated effects of shared partisanship when additional information was or was not present, and benchmarked these effects against the effects of a shared policy preference. 

When no other politically relevant information was provided, we found that partisans evaluated vignettes more positively when the vignettes shared a party identification than when they described an opposing partisanship. But this effect of shared party is smaller than the effect of a shared policy position when each is presented in isolation. Partisanship effects in our experiments were about 71% as large as shared policy preference effects.

Further, when an independently randomized party and policy position were presented together, survey respondents appeared to evaluate the vignettes primarily on the basis of their policy position. When any policy position was listed in the vignette partisanship effects decreased substantially, dropping by about 52%. Policy effects remained large even when partisanship was also known, decreasing by only about 10%. Overall, people responded more positively to opposing partisans who shared a policy position than members of their own party who held a policy position the respondent opposed.

These basic trends held across a variety of issue positions related to immigration, gun control, welfare, abortion, and rights for same sex couples. Trends also held within both major parties. Even the strongest partisans, who care greatly about shared partisanship and shared policy positions when presented in isolation, evaluated vignettes primarily on the basis of policy positions when both were known. 

In a second experiment, we explored what traits survey respondents believe to be most important for positive social interactions. We asked respondents to imagine that they were assigning seats for a friend’s wedding reception, and that they could learn a bit about each guest. Which three pieces of information would they like to learn about the guests in order to ensure that everyone has a good time? Respondents most frequently asked to learn about how the guests know the couple, a personality trait, and a hobby. Gender and sexuality, partisanship, and religion were requested less often, each by about 20% of respondents. For a random subset of respondents, we also gave them the opportunity to learn about guests’ policy preferences. Requests to learn partisanship dropped substantially in this condition. Although a small proportion of respondents asked to learn about both, more people appear to perceive potential conflict along the dimension of policy rather than partisanship.

Together, these results suggest that common measures of partisan animosity may capture programmatic conflict more so than social identity-based partisan hostility. As we work to prevent and mitigate the worst repercussions of partisan animosity, it is essential to incorporate an understanding of this hostility as something more than pure partisan animus or an outgrowth of social group conflict. Instead, partisan animosity seems fundamentally driven by political conflict.  

1 Packer, George. October 12, 2018 https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/a-new-report-offers-insights-into-tribalism-in-the-age-of-trump; Mason, Lilliana. ““I disrespectfully agree”: The differential effects of partisan sorting on social and issue polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 59.1 (2015): 128-145.

2 Ahler, Douglas J., and Gaurav Sood. “The parties in our heads: Misperceptions about party composition and their consequences.” The Journal of Politics 80.3 (2018): 964-98

About the Authors: Lilla V. Orr is Graduate Student, Department of Political Science, at Yale University and Gregory A. Huber is Forst Family Professor of Political Science at Yale University. Their research “The Policy Basis of Measured Partisan Animosity in the United States” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12498) is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

Sometimes Less Is More: Censorship, News Falsification, and Disapproval in 1989 East Germany

Does Affirmative Action Worsen Bureaucratic Performance? Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service

The forthcoming article “Does Affirmative Action Worsen Bureaucratic Performance? Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12497) by Rikhil R. Bhavnani and Alexander Lee is summarized by the author(s) below.

Does Affirmative Action Worsen Performance

Although many countries recruit bureaucrats using affirmative action,
the effect of affirmative action recruits on bureaucratic performance
has rarely been examined. Some worry that affirmative action worsens
bureaucratic performance by diminishing the quality of recruits, while
others posit that it improves performance by making recruits more
representative of and responsive to the population.

This paper examines the effects of affirmative action in India, which
has a powerful upper bureaucracy that recruits using affirmative
action. India’s elite bureaucracy, the Indian Administrative Service
(IAS), is one of the world’s most powerful, monopolizing the most
important bureaucratic posts and supervising the implementation of
anti-poverty programs vital to hundreds of millions. While IAS
officers are selected through a fiercely competitive national exam, at
least 50% of positions are reserved for members of three categories of
traditionally marginalized groups whose low exam scores would
otherwise disqualify them from office.

Our dataset, obtained using online sources and India’s Right to
Information Act, includes detailed data on the origins, educational
backgrounds and complete service histories of every IAS officer, as
well as their caste category and exam scores. The latter two criteria
determine whether and how–with or without affirmative
action–candidates joined the IAS. We therefore know which candidates
were recruited using affirmative action, and by how much they

We focus on the implementation of the world’s largest anti-poverty
program, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(MGNREGA), which aims to reduce poverty by providing rural households
with employment on public works as needed.

To estimate the effects of affirmative action on bureaucratic output,
we examine whether the assignment of affirmative action hires to
districts changes MGNREGA outcomes in those districts. We find that
districts served by affirmative action recruits have similar levels of
MGNREGA employment to other districts. We find similar results when we
estimate the effects of affirmative action hires on road construction,
and time to approval of projects sponsored by legislators using their
constituency development funds.

To explore the mechanisms behind the null estimated effect of
affirmative action, we disaggregate the affirmative action treatment
bundle into two components–disadvantaged group status and exam
performance. We find a slight, statistically insignificant, negative
association between MGNREGA implementation and officer exam rank,
which is more than counterbalanced by a positive and statistically
significant association between disadvantaged group identity and
MGNREGA implementation. In other words, among officers with similar
exam ranks, disadvantaged group officers perform better than others.
The fact that disadvantaged group IAS recruits perform poorly on the
interview portion of the recruitment exam, where it is relatively easy
to guess caste identity, rather than the more objective written
portions of the exam, points to the specific stage at which candidate
quality is understated.

Our results suggest that, at least within selective bureaucracies like
the IAS, improvements in diversity can be obtained without efficiency
losses for some kinds of bureaucratic output. This finding allows us
to reject the worst fears of affirmative action skeptics, namely that
these programs inevitably worsen bureaucratic performance.

About the Author(s): Rikhil Bhavnani is Associate Professor at the University of Wisconsin Madison and Alexander Lee is Assistant Professor at the University of Rochester. Their research “Does Affirmative Action Worsen Bureaucratic Performance? Evidence from the Indian Administrative Service” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12497) is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

Can Terrorism Abroad Influence Migration Attitudes at Home?

The forthcoming article “Can Terrorism Abroad Influence Migration Attitudes at Home” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12494) by Vincenzo Bove, Tobias Böhmelt  and Enzo Nussio is summarized by the authors below.

Can Terrorism Abroad Influence Attitudes About Migration at Home
Over the past few years, political leaders in Europe and elsewhere increasingly link the risk of terrorism to immigration. This includes moderate politicians in countries targeted by terrorism such as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel as well as leaders of states that are less frequently hit by terrorist attacks, such as the Polish president Andrzej Duda.  In this context, our article investigates the impact of terrorism on immigration attitudes across Europe. Specifically, we ask whether terrorist attacks can propagate migration concern from targeted countries to their neighbors.

Although terrorist attacks are rare events, and only a minority of countries are directly and frequently targeted by such violence, we show that all countries are indirectly exposed to attacks in their neighborhood. Moreover, previous studies overwhelmingly focus on the most sensationalist events, with large numbers of victims and unusual media coverage, although the majority of terrorist events is of smaller scale and receives less attention. We highlight that they can still shape public attention on immigration beyond national borders. Finally, existing evidence suggests that public opinion positively correlates with policy outputs. As such, politicians are likely to respond to citizens’ concerns through legislative actions, such as more restrictive immigration policies. One implication of our work is that it is of secondary importance whether the public is “right” about the link between terrorism and migration.

To address our research question, we use the Eurobarometer surveys to capture the salience of immigration from 2003 to 2017. We also compiled data on foreign states’ level of terrorism, which are reasonably exogenous as terrorism abroad is driven by factors that unlikely have a direct link with the timing and scope of the interviews.  We estimate spatial models, which allow us to investigate whether a more elevated concern with migration is observed in the geographic vicinity of the targeted country. Our analysis suggests that the proximity to terrorism, by stimulating emotional public responses, not only affects the salience of immigration within a country, but also diffuses across European states and intensifies immigration-salience attitudes in nearby states.

The “European migrant crisis” has created divisions within the EU and has challenged its commitment to hosting foreign-born individuals, including refugees from war-torn regions. As politicians often respond to public opinion through policy decisions, a poor understanding of what drives public sentiment, particularly the unsubstantiated fear of a migration-terrorism link, can lead to unnecessarily more stringent immigration policies. As all European citizens are exposed to terrorism, even when their country is neither directly targeted nor at imminent risk, our results suggest a more careful consideration of external factors and can help inform the current reforms to Europe’s asylum policy. Our findings are also relevant for other world regions and are one further step in the direction of gaining a better and more general understanding of what affects public opinion, domestic policies, and political reforms.

About the Authors: Tobias Böhmelt is Professor of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, Vincenzo Bove is Professor of Political Science, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, and Enzo Nussio is Senior Researcher, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich. Their research “Can Terrorism Abroad Influence Migration Attitudes at Home?” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12494) is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

When Do Campaign Effects Persist for Years? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

The forthcoming article “When Do Campaign Effects Persist for Years? Evidence from a Natural Experiment” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12488) by Kai Jäger is summarized by the author below.
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Election campaigns are a cornerstone of democracies. The ability of parties to sway the public via election campaigns draws the attention from academics, journalists, and historians alike. The vast academic literature on election campaigns generally suggests, however, that campaign effects are, at best, minimal and short-lived. Given this consensus and the methodological difficulty to conduct long-term studies due to potential confounders, we do not know much about the longevity of campaign effects and what political behavior can be durably shaped by election campaigns.

A unique political event in Germany constitutes a natural experiment to evaluate whether political campaigns can last for nearly a decade: In the 2007 state elections of Bremen, the local right-wing conservative party Citizens in Rage (Bürger in Wut, BIW) missed the 5-percent threshold for parliamentary representation by a mere vote. Due to vote counting irregularities in a precinct in the city of Bremerhaven, the Constitutional Court of Bremen ordered a re-vote in this single precinct over a year later. BIW increased its vote share in the re-vote from 4.35 to 27.57 percent, successfully passing the threshold for parliamentary representation. What preceded the re-vote was a one-sided election campaign focusing on law and order by BIW frontrunner Jan Timke in the precinct. 

I use three different research strategies to evaluate whether BIW’s re-vote campaign could have a long-lasting impact. First, I compared the election results of BIW in the re-vote precinct to the neighboring precincts in subsequent elections, finding that BIW’s vote share has on average increased by about 4.2 percentage points in the re-vote precinct. 

Second, I conducted an observational shoe-leather study, in which I evaluate whether the precinct area has installed more warning signs on their property than the structurally identical neighborhood. Warning signs are an indicator of security-sensitive behavior and suggest that residents have been influenced by BIW’s law-and-order campaign. I find that residents of the re-vote precinct were 13 percentage points more likely than their neighbors to have warning signs.  

Third, I invited the residents of the re-vote area and the structurally similar surroundings to a mail survey to test for attitudinal differences. The survey shows that both groups do not differ in their support for right-wing programmatic positions, but that residents of the re-vote area were 15 percentage points more likely to consider BIW as the most competent party on security. In addition, I also find that the re-vote has negatively affected some levels of trust in the democratic system, as residents of the re-vote area were more likely to believe that election fraud reoccurred in the 2015 Bremen election, in which the right-wing Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) barely missed the five-percent threshold by a few votes. 

There are broader lessons for election campaigns from this unique case, as my study shows that long-term effects can exist if parties are able to run a dominant campaign, which could even shape non-political behavior. Thus, campaigning in uncompetitive first-past-the-post constituencies or in non-election periods might turn out to have long-term benefits.

About the Author: Kai Jäger is a Lecturer in Political Economy, Department of Political Economy, King’s College London. The research “When Do Campaign Effects Persist for Years? Evidence from a Natural Experiment” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12488) is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

Universal Love or One True Religion: Experimental Evidence of the Ambivalent Effect of Religious Ideas on Altruism and Discrimination

The forthcoming article “Universal Love or One True Religion? Experimental Evidence of the Ambivalent Effect of Religious Ideas on Altruism and Discrimination” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12479) is summarized by the author(s) below.
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Contrary to the expectations of secularization theory, religion remains socially important and affects politics in multiple ways. More than 80 percent of the world’s population identifies with a religious group and the number of Christian and Muslim believers is expected to increase even further in the coming decades (Pew Research Center 2017). But how does religion affect behavior?

While religion has different relevant dimensions, we investigate the ambivalent impact of religious ideas on altruism and discrimination. Theoretically, religious ideas can increase altruism if they emphasize principles like universal love. However, the belief in the superiority of one’s own faith can also increase discrimination between different religious groups. Therefore, we argue that the specific content of religious ideas matters for behavior.

We test the impact of two opposing, prominent religious ideas on altruism and discrimination versus a nonreligious control prime: universal love and the notion of only one true religion. Using experimental methods, we conducted dictator games with more than 1,200 Christian and Muslim believers in Ghana and Tanzania. In the dictator game, one person is assigned the role of the “dictator” and endowed with a monetary budget. The dictator decides how to allocate the budget between himself/herself and the second player. Participants played the role of dictator twice. For one of the two decisions, the receiver belonged to the same religious group as the dictator; for the other, they belonged to a different one.

We find that people do not behave more altruistically if we prime either of the two religious ideas as compared to a neutral, non-religious idea. However, religious ideas do matter when it comes to intergroup discrimination. The idea of universal love leads to more equal treatment of both the religious in-group and out-group: it increases the proportion of participants who transfer the same amount of money to both. In contrast, under the one true religion prime, the religious out-group receives 11.82 percent lower transfers compared to the in-group.

Thus, to promote peaceful coexistence between religious groups and to avoid conflict, it seems promising to incentivize religious teachings that are particularly tolerant and that de-emphasize the superiority of one’s own religion, stressing instead tolerance toward other faiths and “universal love.”

About the Author(s): Lisa Hoffmann is a Research Fellow and Doctoral Student, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies & University of Hamburg, Matthias Basedau is Director of the GIGA Institute of African Affairs, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Simone Gobien is a Research Associate, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, and Sebastian Prediger,  is an economist with KfW Development Bank. Their research “Universal Love or One True Religion? Experimental Evidence of the Ambivalent Effect of Religious Ideas on Altruism and Discrimination” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12479) is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

Policymaking with Multiple Agencies

The forthcoming article “Policymaking with Multiple Agencies” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12474) by Peter Bils is summarized by the author(s) below.
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Congress often delegates policymaking authority on similar issues to multiple government agencies. For example, financial products are regulated by both the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Given this overlap, it is regularly proposed that authority should be consolidated into just one of the agencies. In this paper, I study when Congress should delegate to multiple agencies or consolidate authority within one agency.

For many policy issues that feature split authority effective regulation requires agencies to have detailed technical information. Furthermore, information relevant to one agency is often relevant to the other agency as well.  However, as agencies frequently have different policy preferences  it is important to understand how delegating to multiple agencies affects incentives to gather and communicate information. To study this problem, I analyze a game-theoretic model of policymaking with two bureaucratic agencies and Congressional delegation. In the model, Congress can consolidate authority within one agency or split authority between two agencies. To develop policy, agencies expend resources acquiring information that is relevant to both issues. Furthermore, if authority is split then the agencies may choose to share information with each other.

I show that greater divergence between the agencies’ ideal points distorts information sharing and policy choices, but may increase the amount of information acquisition. Congress achieves better policy outcomes by delegating authority to both agencies when the agencies have strong policy disagreements. If the agencies have similar policy preferences, however, then Congress may want to consolidate authority within one agency. This mitigates free-riding and takes advantage of returns to scale.

About the Author: Peter Bils is a Postdoctoral Research Assistant in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. The research “Policymaking with Multiple Agencies” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12474) is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

Donors, Primary Elections, and Polarization in the United States

The forthcoming article “Donors, Primary Elections, and Polarization in the United States” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12477) by Jordan Kujala is summarized by the author(s) below.
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In the United States, the ideological polarization of congressional candidates and members of congress is well known as Democrats and Republicans routinely take policy positions that substantially differ from one another. Recent studies have even found that congressional candidates and elected officials often hold more extreme preferences than their own primary electorate (Bafumi and Herron 2010; Barber 2016; Stone and Simas 2010).  

I argue that these extreme candidates are able to win nomination and office because of the influential role of donors in primary elections. The advantageous role of donors in primaries gives donors the ability to demand policy responsiveness in exchange for the resources necessary to run a successful campaign. While the influence of wealthy donors has often been suggested as a source for the success of extreme candidates, there is little evidence that donors and campaign contributions affect the policy preferences of congressional candidates or the roll-call votes of members of congress. 

To test the influence of donors in primary elections, I analyze 3,600 Democrats and Republicans that won primaries for the House of Representatives between 2002 and 2010. I construct a dataset that contains comparable ideological measures for House nominees, their partisan donor constituencies, and their primary and general electorates. 

Using this dataset, I find the strongest evidence to date that the influence of donors in primary elections substantially affects the district-level polarization of congressional candidatesThese findings suggest Democrats and Republicans that win congressional primaries are more responsive to the policy preferences of the partisan donors in their district than either their primary or general election constituency. As donors take more extreme ideological positions, primary winners take more extreme positions that are further from their district. 

These findings provide evidence that affluent Americans can use their wealth to influence outcomes of the political process. Democratic and Republican House nominees appear to respond inordinately to partisan donors, a group that is disproportionately wealthy and often holds extreme policy views. This unequal response may lead to policy outcomes that favor the wealthy over the middle class and the poor. 


Bafumi, Joseph, and Michael C. Herron. 2010. “Leapfrog Representation and Extremism A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress.” American Political Science Review 104(3): 519-42. 

Barber, Michael J. 2016. “Representing the Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters in the US Senate.” Public Opinion Quarterly 80: 225-49. 

Stone, Walter J., and Elizabeth N. Simas. 2010. “Candidate Valence and Ideological Positions in U.S. House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 54(2): 371-88. 

About the Author: Jordan Kujala is Visiting Assistant Professor at University of California Center Sacramento. The research “Donors, Primary Elections, and Polarization in the United States” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12477) is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.

Measuring Trade Profile with Granular Product-level Data

The forthcoming article “Measuring Trade Profile with Granular Product-level Data” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12473) by In Song Kim, Steven Liao, and Kosuke Imai is summarized by the authors below.
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This paper develops a new dynamic clustering method to effectively summarize two billion observations of product-level international trade data. The proposed method classifies a set of dyads into several clusters based on their similarities in the trade profile, i.e., the product composition of imports and exports. We show that typical dyadic trade relationships evolve from sparse trade to inter-industry trade and then to intra-industry trade while the specific timing for such transition varies significantly by dyads.  Furthermore, this paper develops two novel dyad-year level measures for International Relations research. First, the trade profile measure enables applied researchers to effectively account for changing trade relationships that manifest from product-level trade data. Second, we develop a measure of trade competition that incorporates the extent of competition that each country faces with 
all of its trading partners at the product level.  We apply these measures to examine the network effects of trade competition on the likelihood of signing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). The open-source software, dynCluster: Dynamic Clustering Algorithm, is available as an R package for applying the proposed methods to various other dyadic panel data sets.

About the Author(s): In Song Kim is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Steven Liao is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, and Kosuke Imai is Professor, Department of Government and Department of Statistics, Harvard University. Their research “Measuring Trade Profile with Granular Product-Level Data” (https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12473) is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.


The American Journal of Political Science (AJPS) is the flagship journal of the Midwest Political Science Association and is published by Wiley.