Playing politics with traffic fines: Sheriff elections and political cycles in traffic fines revenue

The forthcoming article “Playing politics with traffic fines: Sheriff elections and political cycles in traffic fines revenue” by Min Su and Christian Buerger is summarized by the author(s) below.

Politicians often make strategic decisions around elections to influence voters’ choices. For instance, they frequently adopt popular budgetary measures, like increasing spending or cutting taxes, just before an election to appeal to their constituents. While these tactics are common among national and state politicians, our research delves into the local arena by examining the behaviors of county sheriffs during election years. 

County sheriffs play a pivotal role in the United States. They oversee a wide range of public safety issues beyond the jurisdiction of city and state police departments. Since sheriffs are directly elected by county constituents, they are one of the most visible and influential actors in local politics. This unique position provides an opportunity to analyze how elections can influence local policy decisions. 

We selected a policy area – traffic fines – sheriffs’ pre-electoral policy manipulation. Traffic stops represent the most common interaction between the public and law enforcement. Additionally, sheriffs wield significant discretion in establishing and enforcing traffic fine policies. We anticipate that, during an election year, sheriffs may reduce traffic fine issuance to prevent voter discontent and negative perceptions of law enforcement performance. 

To test our expectation, we utilized a panel dataset encompassing 57 California counties from 2003 to 2020, spanning four election cycles. Employing fixed-effects models, we investigated the presence, duration, and magnitude of a political cycle in a county’s traffic fines revenue. Our findings were revealing: in sheriff election years, traffic fines revenue decreased by 30 percent. Notably, this decline was short-lived, observed only in the election year. Furthermore, the drop was even more pronounced when an incumbent sheriff sought reelection or when the election was highly contested. 

Our study bridges three pivotal domains of research: political science, law enforcement, and public administration. By illustrating the influence of local elections on traffic enforcement outcomes, our study introduces a new dimension to our understanding of the intricate relationship between politics and policies at the local level. Considering the prevalence of traffic stops, our findings can aid policymakers and reform advocates in gaining a deeper understanding of the electoral motivations that could shape policy initiatives and the implementation of policing practices.

About the Author(s): Min Su is an Associate Professor in the Department of Public Administration at Louisiana State University and Christian Buerger is an Assistant Professor at the O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs at IUPUI. Their research “Playing politics with traffic fines: Sheriff elections and political cycles in traffic fines revenue” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.