Tempering Senses of Superiority: The Virtue of Magnanimity in Democracies

The forthcoming article “Tempering Senses of Superiority: The Virtue of Magnanimity in Democracies” by Juman Kim is summarized by the author below. 

The problems of increased polarization and mutual disrespect in politics have become so commonplace that they rarely surprise us any longer. We find it increasingly difficult to engage in dialogue and communication with our political adversaries. We tend to shamelessly disregard them so easily and hold them in contempt. We often belittle and despise them, asserting our own superiority. Such practices can inspire confidence and help us stay motivated and engaged; also, they can exhaust us, prompting us at times to avoid or reduce cross-party interaction altogether. This is not a flaw attributable only to career politicians, but the one to which most ordinary citizens are also vulnerable. 

Why are democratic citizens so prone to these tendencies? How can we accurately assess the phenomenon of mutual disrespect and civic enmity so pervading most democracies and offer a normatively preferable—yet also practically constructive—prescription? Apparently, simply calling for mutual respect—deliberative or agonistic—is neither realistic nor entirely desirable.  

This paper argues that our urges of superiority must be understood as a feature rather than a bug in democratic politics. Ordinary citizens are prone to understand their political views and those of their opponents in a particular frame of mind, separating what is good, high, and noble from what is bad, low, and despicable, even while at once upholding—or certainly not explicitly discrediting—the foundational principle of democratic equality. The sense of superiority is an integral part of democratic sentiments. What we urgently need to discuss, then, is how to keep alive the sense of superiority that motivates ordinary citizens to participate in democratic conversations while preventing the energies stemming from the very feelings from escalating civic enmity. 

Drawing primarily on Aristotle—especially his Rhetoric—this paper thoroughly examines impudence and magnanimity as two distinct manifestations of the same underlying sense of superiority. Unlike impudence—which involves a reckless and destructive expression of feelings of superiority conducive to heightened aggression—magnanimity does not give rise to an aggressive form of superiority. Why? The reason is that the magnanimous cannot express and retain their sense of superiority through hounding and pouncing on their opponents because the genuine sense of superiority that they wish to savor depends largely on whether they treat offenses against themselves lightly and refuse to confront their opponents in an impetuous or blatantly aggressive way. 

This paper presents a novel, everyday-level democratic theory of magnanimity, highlighting magnanimity as a virtue in the sense of a motivational force that rouses activity or energy in people rather than that of a character trait that bears a strong ethical overtone. The virtue of magnanimity so understood involves our desire for superiority—and therefore our impulses of disregard for our opponents’ opinion—but its tempered manifestation helps us engage in cross-party conversations and keep them going without engendering or aggravating the climate of civic enmity. To promote this peculiar attitude toward political adversaries alone can make a welcoming and valuable contribution to contemporary democratic theory and practice.

About the Author: Juman Kim is an Assistant Professor at Towson University. Their research “Tempering Senses of Superiority: The Virtue of Magnanimity in Democracies” is now available in Early View and will appear in a forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Political Science.